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97 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2019)

Stuck Between a CAAF and a Hard Place: The Coram Nobis
Petition of Private Ronald Gray and the Weakening of Military
Justice*
INTRODUCTION
Private Ronald Gray is the United States military’s longest
resident of death row.1 Only three other prisoners sit there with him
at the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, where he has awaited execution since 1988.2 Private Gray’s
case has been through numerous rounds of hearings, appeals, and
petitions in both the military justice system and in the federal Article
III courts. His most recent attempt at review has hit an interesting,
and frustrating, roadblock.
Private Gray’s story begins in December 1986, when a spree of
rapes, robberies, and murders took place at Fort Bragg and the
neighboring city of Fayetteville, North Carolina.3 The victims
included Kimberly Ann Ruggles, a civilian cab driver who was raped
and murdered, her cab abandoned in the woods near Fort Bragg;
Private Laura Lee Vickery-Clay, who was abducted, raped, and
murdered, her body also abandoned in the woods of Fort Bragg; and
Private Mary Ann Lang Nameth, who was raped and stabbed in her
barracks room but survived the attack.4 Private Gray was arrested,
charged with the above crimes, and convicted on April 12, 1988, by a
general court-martial on twelve counts or “specifications,” as they are
called in the military justice system.5 He was sentenced to death.6

* © 2019 William R. Cauley.
1. Description of Cases for Those Sentenced to Death in U.S. Military, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/description-cases-those-sentenced-deathus-military [https://perma.cc/VX4E-4HAH].
2. Id.; The U.S. Military Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/us-military-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/64ZS-JD34].
3. United States v. Gray, 37 M.J. 730, 735–36 (A.C.M.R. 1992); see also Brief for the
United States in Opposition at 2–4, Gray v. United States, 532 U.S. 919 (2001) (mem.)
(No. 00-607), 2001 WL 34117598, at *2–4 [hereinafter Brief in Opposition].
4. Gray, 37 M.J. at 735–36; Brief in Opposition, supra note 3, at 2–4. Gray also
pleaded guilty to twenty-two other counts of, inter alia, murder, rape, and robbery in
North Carolina Superior Court and was given eight life sentences. Brief in Opposition,
supra note 3, at 2 n.1.
5. Gray, 37 M.J. at 733 (stating that Gray was convicted of two specifications of
premeditated murder, one specification of attempted murder, three specifications of rape,
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Private Gray filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the
first military court of appeals, the Army Court of Criminal Appeals
(“ACCA”).7 A writ of error coram nobis is a request for
extraordinary relief that asserts a fundamental error by that court or a
lower court in a previous judgment, order, or conviction.8 After
ACCA denied the merits of Gray’s claims of error, he appealed to the
highest military appellate court, the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces (“CAAF”).9 It was here that Private Gray’s roadblock
appeared. CAAF did not deny the merit of his claims but rather held
that it did not have jurisdiction to hear such a petition in the first
place.10 Furthermore, CAAF dismissed the petition with prejudice.11
This holding was issued about a year after a federal district court
similarly dismissed Gray’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus for
want of jurisdiction.12 Thus, Private Gray was stuck: both CAAF and
the district court ruled that he needed to exhaust his remedies in the
other court before his cause could proceed in their court.13
This outcome is a significant development in the history of the
military justice system and of the military’s capital punishment
process in particular. Over time, the system has grown more
protective of defendants’ rights—such as by liberally granting juror
disqualifications and conforming rules of evidence and procedure to
those of civilian courts—thus enhancing the legitimacy of military
courts as a tool of criminal justice in America. But a growing
tendency on the part of these courts to refuse to exercise their full
powers of review, as in their summary dismissal of Private Gray’s
petition, now threatens that very legitimacy.
This Recent Development proceeds in three parts. Part I
describes the background of Private Gray’s case from his crime and
conviction to his many appeals and reviews. Part II briefly tells the
story of the last military defendant to be executed in 1961 and uses
that as a starting point to discuss the evolving legitimacy of the

two specifications of robbery, one specification of larceny, one specification of burglary,
and two specifications of forcible sodomy).
6. Id.
7. Gray v. United States, 76 M.J. 579, 581 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2017).
8. See infra Section III.A.
9. United States v. Gray, 77 M.J. 5, 6 (C.A.A.F. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2709
(2018) (mem.).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Gray v. Belcher, No. 5:08-cv-03289-JTM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149574, at *4
(D. Kan. Oct. 26, 2016).
13. See Gray, 77 M.J. at 6; Gray, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149574, at *2–4.
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military’s capital process. Part III argues that military courts possess
the authority to review a petition like Private Gray’s and that failure
to do so not only leaves Private Gray out in the cold but also weakens
the legitimacy and independence of the military justice system.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
While this Recent Development is concerned with Private
Ronald Gray’s most recent appearance before CAAF, it is first
necessary to trace some of the winding path through the military
justice system that led him there. As noted above, Gray was convicted
of twelve specifications by a general court-martial in 1988 and
sentenced to death.14 After a series of motions, hearings, and
interlocutory appeals on Gray’s mental capacity and the adequacy of
his defense counsel, Gray’s first appeal on the merits of his case was
heard by the Army Court of Military Review (“ACMR”),
predecessor to ACCA, on April 8, 1992.15 The defense alleged
twenty-seven errors in their petition, but the ACMR held that all the
assignments of error were meritless, and the court affirmed the
conviction and sentence.16 A supplemental hearing was then granted
on twenty-nine additional assignments of error, but the ACMR again
upheld the conviction and sentence.17 Additional delays interrupted
Gray’s appeal to CAAF,18 but the military’s highest appellate court
ultimately affirmed the conviction and sentence in 1999.19
With his opportunities for relief on direct review exhausted,
Private Gray awaited presidential approval of his sentence.20 First, the
case went through clemency review, both at the Office of the Judge
Advocate General and at the U.S. Department of Justice.21 President
George W. Bush approved the sentence on July 28, 2008, and the
Secretary of the Army scheduled his execution for December 10,
14. United States v. Gray, 37 M.J. 730, 733 (A.C.M.R. 1992).
15. Id. at 734–35.
16. Id. at 733–34. This part covers the general procedural history of Gray’s case. Some
of the specific issues raised on appeal will be addressed in greater detail in Part II.
17. United States v. Gray, 37 M.J. 751, 754, 761 (A.C.M.R. 1993).
18. See United States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1, 10 (C.A.A.F. 1999). Gray’s original appellate
counsel was forced to withdraw by a transfer to new military duties. Id. In addition, the
court heard supplemental arguments in the wake of a Supreme Court decision concerning
military capital punishment in Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996). Gray, 51 M.J.
at 10; see also Loving, 517 U.S. at 751, 774.
19. Gray, 51 M.J. at 64.
20. A military execution cannot be carried out without the approval of the President.
See 10 U.S.C. § 857(a)(3) (Supp. 2017).
21. Gray v. Gray, No. 5:08-CV-3289-JTM, 2015 WL 5714260, at *17 (D. Kan. Sept. 29,
2015), rev’d, 645 F. App’x 624 (10th Cir. 2016).
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2008.22 Gray filed a petition to stay the execution and for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas.23 The stay was granted pending further review.24
Around 2015, the case entered truly complex procedural
territory. The district court considered most of the claims in the
habeas corpus petition to be without merit under a “full and fair
consideration” standard.25 There were, however, other issues raised
by the petition that were never considered by the military courts.26
Ordinarily, these new objections would be considered waived, but
Gray’s counsel, anticipating this procedural hurdle, concurrently filed
a petition for extraordinary relief in the form of a writ of error coram
nobis in the military courts.27 This presented the possibility that the
new assignments of error would in fact be reviewed by a military
court, thereby removing the procedural bar to the district court’s
consideration of his habeas petition.28 As such, the district court
created a “hybrid dismissal,” dismissing without prejudice those
claims pending review in the military courts under the coram nobis
petition and considering the remaining claims on the merits.29 The
Tenth Circuit summarily reversed the hybrid dismissal and remanded
with orders for the district court to adopt an alternative disposition,
such as total dismissal of the petition.30 The district court chose to
dismiss the entire petition without prejudice pending final disposition
of Gray’s petition for coram nobis relief in the military courts.31
Private Gray’s case then arrived at the point of interest to this
Recent Development. Gray’s petition for coram nobis relief began in
ACCA. ACCA determined that it had jurisdiction to consider six of
Gray’s seven claims for relief but denied all of them.32 This holding
would have seemed ordinary enough, but upon appeal to CAAF, the
jurisdictional holding—and the whole case—was turned on its head.
22. Id. at *17–18.
23. Id. at *18.
24. Id.
25. Id. at *22 (“[W]hen a military decision has dealt ‘fully and fairly’ with an
allegation . . . ‘it is not open to a federal civil court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate
the evidence.’” (quoting Watson v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 143, 144 (10th Cir. 1986))).
26. Id. at *22–23.
27. Id. at *23.
28. See id. at *24.
29. See Gray v. Gray, 645 F. App’x 624, 625 (10th Cir. 2016); Gray, 2015 WL 5714260,
at *37.
30. Gray, 645 F. App’x at 625–26.
31. Gray v. Belcher, No. 5:08-cv-03289-JTM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149574, at *1–4
(D. Kan. Oct. 26, 2016).
32. See Gray v. United States, 76 M.J. 579, 594 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2017).
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CAAF held that the military courts altogether lacked the
jurisdiction to hear the coram nobis petition.33 The court reasoned
that the case had reached final judgment under Article 76 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) and thus was beyond all
review or alteration by the military courts.34 Furthermore, the court
held that even if Article 76 were not an obstacle, the military courts
could not extend extraordinary relief until Gray had exhausted his
remedies in the Article III courts.35 After the Supreme Court’s recent
denial of Gray’s petition for a writ of certiorari,36 Private Gray now
finds himself in the strange position of having been denied review in
both the military courts and the Article III federal courts on the basis
of having not yet exhausted his remedies in the other system.
II. THE MILITARY CAPITAL PROCESS: EVOLUTION AND
LEGITIMACY
The military justice system is, at its core, unique, as its power
comes not from Article III of the U.S. Constitution but from
Article I’s commitment to Congress of the power “[t]o make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”37
It also has unique goals. It is designed not only to “promote justice”
but also “to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the
armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military
establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the
United States.”38 Despite its uniqueness, it has recently become the
stated goal of some members of Congress to steadily align military
justice more closely with the federal Article III courts.39 Differences
remain—particularly the core principle of maintaining order and
discipline—but the military justice system continues to be
fundamentally legitimate because there has been a concerted effort
33. United States v. Gray, 77 M.J. 5, 6 (C.A.A.F. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2709
(2018) (mem.).
34. Id.; see 10 U.S.C. § 876 (Supp. 2017). Article 76 codifies the common law principle
of final judgments, which are meant to prevent repeated attacks on fully tried and
reviewed cases. See § 876; see also United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 916 (2009).
35. Gray, 77 M.J. at 6 (citing Denedo, 556 U.S. at 911).
36. Gray v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2709 (2018) (mem.).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
38. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES pt. I, ¶ 3 (2019) [hereinafter
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2019)], https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/
99/Documents/2019%20MCM%20(Final)%20(20190108).pdf?ver=2019-01-11-115724-610
[https://perma.cc/4NB2-LJZT].
39. See, e.g., 162 CONG. REC. S6871 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2016) (statement of Sen.
McCain) (“The legislation . . . incorporates best practices from Federal criminal practice
and procedures.”).
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throughout its history to scrutinize its practices and develop necessary
procedural safeguards.
The military last executed an American soldier, Private John A.
Bennett, in 1961.40 His case serves as an interesting companion case to
Private Gray’s and a starting point for examining the evolution of
military capital punishment, both at trial and on appeal. This part
briefly discusses the facts and history of Private Bennett’s case to
show how the nascent UCMJ worked in practice. It then discusses the
ways in which military justice, particularly military capital
punishment, has changed and how, consequently, the system is a
legitimate counterpart to civilian criminal justice. Finally, it will apply
this historical analysis to some of the issues raised in Private Gray’s
court-martial and show how his case was, in its initial stages, a display
of proper military justice at work.
A. A Comparison Case: Private John A. Bennett
The most recent military execution was the hanging of Private
John A. Bennett in 1961 for the December 1954 rape of Gertrude
Aigner, an eleven-year-old Austrian girl.41 On February 8, 1955, after
five days of trial, a general court-martial convicted Private Bennett of
rape and attempted murder and sentenced him to death.42 Within
eighteen months, the Court of Military Appeals (predecessor to
CAAF) heard his final direct appeal and upheld his conviction.43 He
filed a habeas petition, but it was denied in 1959.44 President Dwight
Eisenhower approved Bennett’s sentence, and he was hanged at the
United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on
April 13, 1961.45
Without doubt, Private Bennett’s case raises eyebrows at first
glance. First, he was executed less than seven years after his arrest.46
By comparison, as of 2006, the average capital case took more than
eight years just to get to a final direct appeal (excluding collateral
40. Richard A. Serrano, Pvt. John Bennett Is the Only U.S. Soldier Executed for Rape
in Peacetime, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/sep/10/
magazine/tm-18406 [https://perma.cc/6P23-DZL5].
41. See United States v. Bennett, 21 C.M.R. 223, 225 (C.M.A. 1956).
42. Transcript of Record at 1, United States v. Bennett, 21 C.M.R. 223 (C.M.A. 1956)
(No. 7709) [hereinafter Transcript of Record]; see also Stephen C. Reyes, Dusty Gallows:
The Execution of Private Bennett and the Modern Capital Court-Martial, 62 NAVAL L.
REV. 103, 104 (2013).
43. Bennett, 21 C.M.R. at 228.
44. Bennett v. Davis, 267 F.2d 15, 18 (10th Cir. 1959).
45. See Serrano, supra note 40.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 41–45.
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proceedings).47 Second, Private Bennett is the only American soldier
to be executed for rape during peacetime.48 Moreover, it is at least
plausible that racial bias influenced Private Bennett’s case. Like ten
of the eleven other soldiers who were executed during the time of his
case,49 Private Bennett was black.50 Furthermore, of the six white
soldiers awaiting execution during that same period, all six were given
a reprieve—two by presidential commutation and four by judicial
decisions.51
Notwithstanding any potential racial bias, there are still a
number of reasons that his conviction, sentence, or both would likely
be overturned today. First, he was tried by a panel52 of nine
members,53 whereas modern rules require twelve members in a capital
case.54 Second, his defense counsel seemingly had no capital litigation
experience, and his assistant defense counsel was not even a lawyer.55
While the military has no strict learned-counsel requirement in capital
cases56—though it is a feature of another facet of military justice: the
military commissions used at Guantanamo Bay57—it would be
unthinkable today to put on a capital defense with a nonlawyer in the
second chair. Finally, Bennett received virtually no mitigation
defense, aside from a few fellow soldiers testifying to his good
military character.58 No thorough examination or challenge was made
47. See Dwight Sullivan, Killing Time: Two Decades of Military Capital Litigation, 189
MIL. L. REV. 1, 41 (2006).
48. Serrano, supra note 40. This fact is more notable considering that only sixteen
years later, the Supreme Court held that death sentences for rape not resulting in murder
were unconstitutional. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597–98 (1977).
49. See Dwight Sullivan, A Matter of Life and Death: Examining the Military Death
Penalty’s Fairness, FED. LAW., June 1998, at 38, 44 (discussing military executions between
1954 and 1961).
50. Serrano, supra note 40.
51. See id.
52. Court-martial panels are roughly equivalent to juries in civilian courts.
53. Transcript of Record, supra note 42, at 6. Eleven members were assigned to the
panel, but one did not appear for duty, id. at 2, and another was peremptorily struck by
the defense, id. at 10.
54. 10 U.S.C. § 825a (Supp. 2017). While there is an exception to this rule for
“military exigencies,” id., Bennett was tried in peacetime Europe nearly ten years after the
end of World War II, see supra text accompanying notes 41–42, so this exception likely
would not bear on the case.
55. Transcript of Record, supra note 42, at 5 (noting that assistant defense counsel
Captain Thomas Guptill was “not certified in accordance [with Article] 27(b)” and that he
was branched “AGC,” presumably the Adjutant General’s Corps).
56. See United States v. Hennis, 77 M.J. 7, 9 (C.A.A.F. 2017). In federal court, capital
defendants must be afforded access to at least one counsel “learned in the law applicable
to capital cases.” 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (2012).
57. 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(C)(ii) (2012).
58. See Reyes, supra note 42, at 127.
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on the basis of Bennett’s low IQ, family history of mental illness, or
probable state of extraordinary intoxication and incapacity at the time
of his crime.59 Since 2004, the military appellate courts have made
clear that a death sentence cannot stand without a thorough
mitigation defense that raises these issues if they are present.60
B.

The Evolution of Military Justice

With Private Bennett’s case in mind, the next question of interest
is how the system arrived at its current status. In the last half century,
the Supreme Court has raised the constitutional floor for the use of
capital punishment by any sentencing court, military or civilian.
Alongside this development, the Supreme Court has also scrutinized
the scope of military criminal jurisdiction, with an eye toward
guaranteeing military defendants at least basic due process. Given
these steady and major changes in the law, it is not surprising that
there have been so few capital sentences or executions since Private
Bennett’s. A close look at this evolution bolsters the claim that
military justice has, through responsive adaptation, maintained its
legitimacy. Furthermore, these changes provide a starting point for
the analysis of the ultimate fairness of Private Ronald Gray’s own
conviction and sentence—fairness undermined by CAAF’s summary
treatment of his petitions.
1. Changes to Capital Punishment
A decade or so after Private Bennett’s execution, capital
punishment in America underwent a change. In 1972, Furman v.
Georgia61 brought all executions to a halt.62 The rationale for this
decision was split into five opinions,63 but ultimately all of the
concurring judges agreed that capital punishment as practiced at the
time was so arbitrary and capricious as to violate the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.64 Thirty-five states responded by amending
their death penalty statutes in hopes the changes would pass
constitutional muster.65 The Supreme Court subsequently dispensed
with any notion that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se.66 In
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. at 104, 132–34.
See United States v. Kreutzer, 59 M.J. 773, 783 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2004).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
Id. at 239–40.
Id. at 240–374.
See, e.g., id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–81 (1976).
See id. at 169.
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1976, the Court in Gregg v. Georgia67 held that a system of capital
punishment “circumscribed by legislative guidelines” was no longer
constitutionally suspect.68 However, in 1977, Coker v. Georgia69
narrowed the death penalty when the Supreme Court held that death
was “disproportionate” to the crime of rape.70 And in 2008, Kennedy
v. Louisiana71 confirmed the rule that the death penalty is similarly
disproportionate for the rape of a child.72
The military justice system followed the federal system’s lead in
adopting greater procedural protections for capital defendants. In
1983 in United States v. Matthews,73 the defendant was convicted of
premeditated murder and rape, and the panel sentenced him to death
following a secret ballot with no further report of their findings of
fact.74 On appeal, the Court of Military Appeals held that this
sentencing procedure was not adequate under the Supreme Court’s
Furman and Gregg rulings.75 The court reversed the sentence and
pronounced that military capital punishment would only be
constitutional if Congress or the President promulgated new
procedures to provide for specific findings of aggravating
circumstances in capital sentences.76 In 1984, President Ronald
Reagan issued an Executive Order promulgating these new
procedures,77 which are now found in Rule for Courts-Martial 1004.78
In most respects, military capital sentencing now bears a
reasonable resemblance to its federal counterpart. Panels must have
at least twelve members and must vote unanimously.79 In peacetime,
the penalty is only available for murder under specified aggravating
circumstances.80 Imposition of such a sentence triggers mandatory

67. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
68. Id. at 206–07.
69. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
70. Id. at 597–98 (stating that “the death penalty . . . is an excessive penalty for the
rapist who, as such, does not take human life”).
71. 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
72. Id. at 413.
73. 16 M.J. 354 (C.M.A. 1983).
74. See id. at 359, 361.
75. See id. at 377–80 (holding that the failure to specify aggravating factors rendered
the sentencing procedure inadequate).
76. See id. at 383, 392.
77. See Exec. Order No. 12,460, 49 Fed. Reg. 3,169 (Jan. 26, 1984).
78. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2019), supra note 38,
pt. II, r. 1004(c); Reyes, supra note 42, at 105.
79. 10 U.S.C. § 825a (Supp. 2017).
80. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2019), supra note 38,
pt. II, r. 1004(c).
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review in the military appellate court.81 In comparison, federal
statutes also require Article III courts to consider aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in cases of capital sentencing.82 The jury
must also consist of twelve members.83 While a death sentence does
not trigger automatic review,84 it is mandated that such an appeal, if
timely filed, be given priority over all others.85
2. Evolving Standards of Due Process and Fluctuating Military
Jurisdiction
Even before Furman’s changes to capital punishment, the
Supreme Court briefly put a stop not merely to military death
sentences but to all courts-martial that did not concern crimes of a
strictly military nature.86 In O’Callahan v. Parker,87 the defendant had
been convicted of an assault and attempted rape while off base and
off duty.88 The Court held the Constitution’s mandate that Congress
“[govern] . . . the land and naval Forces” was limited to crimes related
to military service—“the flouting of military authority, the security of
a military post, or the integrity of military property.”89 Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, put great emphasis on the
insufficiency of the military courts in protecting the constitutional
rights of citizen-soldiers.90 Under this new construction, if a soldier
misbehaved off post—or on post in a manner not connected to his
duties—the case would have to go before civilian authorities.91
The Court would not recognize a full restoration of court-martial
jurisdiction over all crimes committed by servicemembers until 1987,
when it upheld a coast guardsman’s court-martial conviction for
sexual assault of a minor while off duty.92 In reinstating court-martial

81. 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(1) (2012).
82. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3592, 3593(d) (2012).
83. Id. § 3593(b).
84. See id. § 3595(a) (requiring review by the court of appeals only if the defendant
timely appeals).
85. Id.
86. See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 273 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United
States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). “[E]xpansion of military discipline beyond its proper domain
carries with it a threat to liberty.” Id. at 265.
87. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
88. Id. at 259–60.
89. See id. at 273–74 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14).
90. See id. at 262 (“Those civil rights are the constitutional stakes in the present
litigation.”); id. at 265 (“A court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice
. . . .”).
91. See id. at 262, 268–69, 273–74.
92. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 450–51 (1987).
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jurisdiction, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that for a century
before O’Callahan, the Court had interpreted the plain language of
Article I to extend court-martial jurisdiction to all crimes determined
appropriate by Congress.93 Furthermore, O’Callahan had served only
to create confusion, as courts were forced to determine what terms
such as “service-connected” really meant.94 Military law can extend to
virtually all activity conducted by soldiers because the UCMJ
assimilates most federal and state crimes (of the state in which the act
occurred) into the so-called General Article, regardless of their
relationship to military duties.95
A revival of respect for the fairness of the military justice system
since the nadir of O’Callahan was more than a mere caprice of
changing justices on the Supreme Court. The system itself has
changed to establish its legitimacy through guarantees of due process
and fairness. Even prior to O’Callahan, the very establishment of the
UCMJ in 1950 stands as a marker of the commitment to a process
that is as fair as it is orderly.96 Congress and the President have
continued to make improvements to the guarantees of due process
over the years, including the institutionalization of military judges in
196897 and the creation of the Military Rules of Evidence in 1980.98

93. Id. at 439.
94. See id. at 448–49.
95. See 10 U.S.C. § 934 (Supp. 2017) (making criminal “all disorders and neglects to
the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which
persons subject to this chapter may be guilty”). The “Punitive Articles” part of the Manual
for Courts-Martial provides a nonexhaustive list of specific offenses that can be tried under
the General Article. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2019), supra
note 38, pt. IV. Assimilation of state crimes into “areas within federal jurisdiction,”
including military installations and courts-martial, is effected by what is known as the
Federal Assimilative Crimes Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2012).
96. See U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. LEGAL CTR. & SCH., CRIMINAL LAW
DESKBOOK: PRACTICING MILITARY JUSTICE 1–2 (2018). The citizen-army of WWII
chafed under the swiftness of military justice. After over a century of using the Articles of
War, Congress adopted a unified military justice system that would more closely resemble
civilian criminal justice. Id.
97. Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.). Previously, courts-martial only required a
“law officer” to advise the panel on the law. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES ¶ 39 (1951) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES (1951)], http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/manual-1951.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Y69V-CXF5].The law officer was an attorney, but one whose regular duties were not that
of a judge. Id.
98. H.F. Gierke, The Thirty-Fifth Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture on Criminal Law, 193
MIL. L. REV. 178, 190 (2007).
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What Does This Mean for Private Ronald Gray?

Given the twists and turns of this history, it is not surprising that
the military did not perform an execution for at least the first few
decades since Private Bennett was put to death. Still, there remains
the question of the lengthy delay since Private Ronald Gray’s
conviction and sentencing. Interestingly enough, the delay is mostly
attributable to the modern military system’s ultimate fairness, and
that same fairness is probably the reason why Private Gray’s sentence
will remain in place.
Some substantial differences still remain between the military
capital process and that of the civilian system. As mentioned above,
there is no requirement for learned capital defense counsel for
military cases.99 Another difference of note is a feature of the military
justice system as a whole: the convening authority selects the jury
pool (or panel)—that is, the same person who charges the defendant
and approves their sentence.100 On the other hand, some differences
in the military system actually offer the defendant arguably more
protection than they would receive in a civilian court. In courtsmartial, all trials, capital or otherwise, have bifurcated findings and
sentencing phases, so even a relatively inexperienced defense counsel
would be familiar with the process of offering mitigation defenses.101
Military voir dire includes a “liberal grant mandate” of for-cause
strikes requested by defense counsel.102 Lastly, during military
appeals, the courts have the power to exercise de novo review of even
the findings of fact.103
Consequently, it is unlikely Private Gray’s cause will advance
very far. The federal courts usually grant great deference to the rules
and procedures of the military courts.104 This standard of review has
remained largely constant since Private John Bennett’s trial and
execution.105 Given the deferential standard of review, it would take a
99. Compare United States v. Hennis, 77 M.J. 7, 9 (C.A.A.F. 2017), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3005 (2012) (requiring learned defense counsel in all federal capital prosecutions).
100. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2019), supra note 38,
pt. II, r. 503(a).
101. See id. pt. II, r. 1001(a).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Clay, 64 M.J. 274, 276–77 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
103. See United States v. Matthews, 16 M.J. 354, 378 (C.M.A. 1983).
104. See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 44 (1976) (holding that findings of due
process violations are only appropriate if the need for other or additional process is “so
extraordinarily weighty as to overcome the balance struck by Congress”).
105. See Bennett v. Davis, 267 F.2d 15, 17 (10th Cir. 1959) (“We inquire only to
determine whether competent military tribunals gave fair and full consideration to all of
the procedural safeguards deemed essential to a fair trial under military law.”); Gray v.
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very substantial showing by any petitioner to convince the Article III
courts that their case warranted reversal. That showing becomes even
more difficult to assert given the many procedural safeguards and
advantages afforded military defendants. Many of the safeguards
described above have been in place since the UCMJ was promulgated
in 1950,106 and those that were not had been put into place in time for
Ronald Gray’s court-martial. Indeed, Gray’s direct appeals took more
than a decade to complete because the appellate courts granted
motion after motion to examine his competency; file supplemental
assignments of error; and replace, withdraw, and replace again his
defense counsel.107 CAAF considered no fewer than seventy asserted
issues and errors in its review and found none warranted reversal.108
Another eight years passed after this review because no execution
may be carried out without the personal authorization of the
President.109
This is not to say that Private Gray’s original case did not raise
interesting questions. His appeal presented a chance for CAAF to
consider a host of issues, many unique to military justice, such as
whether the practice of panel members asking questions of witnesses
during trial infringed upon the right to an impartial jury.110 Another
example was whether the post-trial discovery of Private Gray’s brain
damage required a new trial be ordered.111 The courts answered both
of these questions in the negative,112 but the more important question
answered was the adequacy of the appellate review given to Private
Gray’s case. The issues were thoroughly and exhaustively considered,
Gray, No. 5:08-CV-3289-JTM, 2015 WL 5714260, at *22 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2015)
(repeating the Supreme Court’s admonition that “when a military decision has dealt ‘fully
and fairly’ with an allegation . . . ‘it is not open to a federal civil court to grant the writ
simply to re-evaluate the evidence’” (quoting Watson v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 143, 144 (10th
Cir. 1986))), rev’d, 645 F. App’x 624 (10th Cir. 2016). Even the brief foray into limits on
military jurisdiction imposed by O’Callahan recognized this deference to military process
so long as proper military jurisdiction was found. See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258,
272 (1969).
106. See generally MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (1951), supra
note 97. In addition, one of the more glaring inconsistencies with ordinary judicial
procedure noted in Bennett’s case, representation of the defendant in part by a nonlawyer,
had been rectified by the time of the promulgation of the 1968 Manual for Courts-Martial.
See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES ch. III, ¶ 6d. (1968),
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/manual-1968.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PJY-DGEY].
107. See United States v. Gray, 51 M.J. 1, 9–10 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
108. See id. at 6–8, 64.
109. 10 U.S.C. § 857(a)(3) (Supp. 2017).
110. See Gray, 51 M.J. at 50.
111. See id. at 12–14.
112. See id. at 14, 50.

97 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2019)

1008

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

and military justice was shown to be something more than a “rough
form of justice.”113 It may be cold comfort to capital defendants, but it
is precisely this exhaustive treatment coupled with the
aforementioned procedures and safeguards that undergird the
legitimacy of the military justice system. But, as will be discussed in
the next part, CAAF’s treatment of Private Gray’s latest petition for
relief threatens this legitimacy.
III. THE MILITARY COURTS MUST ASSERT THEIR AUTHORITY TO
PRESERVE THE LEGITIMACY OF THEIR SYSTEM
CAAF’s determination that it lacked the jurisdiction to issue a
writ of error coram nobis is part of a broader trend in the military
courts over the past several years to decline to issue extraordinary
writs and to, more importantly, narrow the scope of their own
authority.114 This is an unfortunate trend for two reasons. First, it
threatens to subordinate the military courts to their Article III
counterparts such that it calls into question the military courts’
usefulness. Second, in the meantime, it leaves defendants and
petitioners like Private Gray stuck between an Article III system that
defers to the military courts and military courts that are unwilling to
exercise their own power. Professor Stephen I. Vladeck’s essay
Military Courts and the All Writs Act discusses these developments in
great detail,115 but further examination is required when the stakes are
raised to life or death. This part will first outline the scope of the
military courts’ authority as it relates to collateral review and
extraordinary relief, with particular reference to the All Writs Act.116
It will then show how the military courts’ failure to properly utilize
this power has negatively impacted both Private Gray’s petition and,
more broadly, the foundations of the military justice system.
A. The Scope of the Authority of Military Courts
The powers of the military courts flow directly from Congress’s
constitutional mandate to make “[r]ules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”117 The standing military
appellate courts are specifically endowed with vast powers of review,
113. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 (1957).
114. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and the All Writs Act, 17 GREEN
BAG 2D 191 (2014) (examining military courts’ refusal to exercise the extent of their
powers).
115. See id. at 191–205.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012).
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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including the power to review findings of fact.118 Important for the
purposes of this Recent Development, the military courts as “courts
established by Act of Congress” are endowed with the power of the
All Writs Act.119 This power covers both writs “in aid of [the court’s]
jurisdiction”120 and interlocutory writs and judgments.121 The powers
of the All Writs Act enable jurisdiction, but they may not be used to
enlarge a court’s jurisdiction.122 The Supreme Court has explicitly
recognized this power in Noyd v. Bond123 with regard to any case a
military court may review.124
Writs of error coram nobis are “ancient writ[s] . . . available at
common law to correct errors of fact.”125 Roughly translated, coram
nobis means “before us,” meaning it may be used to challenge the
validity of judgments or orders in the court that issued the judgment
or order.126 It is an extraordinary remedy meant to correct “errors of
the most fundamental character.”127 It is not a true collateral attack,
although it bears some resemblance in that it is distinct from ordinary
direct appeals.128 Rather, coram nobis is another form of appeal
within the same criminal case.129 Procedural finality of a judgment is
not a bar to consideration of coram nobis relief.130
The military courts began to waver on the use of the All Writs
power following Clinton v. Goldsmith.131 In that case, an Air Force
officer was administratively—that is, not as a result of a court-martial
proceeding—removed from the service, and he petitioned the military

118. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 866(d)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-5 & 116-8).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012).
120. Id.
121. Id. § 1651(b) (granting the power of “writ or rule nisi,” meaning an intermediate
or interlocutory ruling).
122. See Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 41–43 (1985).
Specifically, the Court quoted a Supreme Court opinion in which Chief Justice Stone
wrote that “[t]he writs may not be used as a substitute for an authorized appeal.” Id. at 41
(quoting U.S. Alkali Exp. Ass’n. v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 203 (1945)).
123. 395 U.S. 683 (1969).
124. See id. at 695 n.7.
125. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506–07 (1954).
126. See id. at 507 n.9.
127. Id. at 512 (quoting United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914)).
128. See United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 913 (2009); Morgan, 346 U.S. at 505
n.4.
129. See Denedo, 556 U.S. at 913; Morgan, 346 U.S. at 505 n.4.
130. Denedo, 556 U.S. at 915–16.
131. 526 U.S. 529 (1999); cf. Vladeck, supra note 114, at 194–203 (using Goldsmith as a
starting point in tracing a path to other cases in which military courts have declined,
wrongly in Professor Vladeck’s view, to use extraordinary writs).

97 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2019)

1010

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

appellate courts for extraordinary relief by an injunction.132 CAAF
issued the injunction against the President as Commander-in-Chief,
relying on the All Writs Act as authority.133 The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed, holding that CAAF’s jurisdiction only
extended reviewing matters tried and disposed of by courts-martial.134
CAAF’s enjoining of the President on a related, but nonetheless
separate, administrative decision was an expansion of the court’s
jurisdiction, a direct contravention of All Writs Act jurisprudence.135
This rebuke of the use of extraordinary writs was not an
extraordinary action; rather it was in conformity with longstanding
doctrine across the federal courts, not just the military courts.136 It was
not a substantive narrowing of the military courts’ power but rather a
restraining of that power to what it was all along.
If there was any doubt about the scope of military courts’
authority under the All Writs Act, the Supreme Court provided some
clarity in United States v. Denedo.137 There, the Court considered the
cause of a sailor discharged under a court-martial conviction and
facing subsequent deportation in immigration proceedings.138 The
sailor, Denedo, petitioned for a writ of error coram nobis, claiming
his court-martial conviction was invalid.139 If true, the writ of error
might stay his deportation.140 CAAF had held that coram nobis
review was appropriate, but remanded the case to the lower court for
further proceedings.141 A dissenting CAAF judge argued that this was
incorrect under Goldsmith because the case had reached final
judgment, removing it from CAAF’s jurisdiction.142 Justice Kennedy,

132. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. at 531. It is notable, though, that Major Goldsmith was in fact
convicted by a court-martial for the same conduct underlying his administrative
separation. Id. at 531–32. However, this simply was not the basis of his petition to the Air
Force Court of Criminal Appeals and appeal to CAAF.
133. Id. at 532.
134. See id. at 531.
135. See id. at 537; see also Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 41–
43 (1985) (stating that the All Writs Act is not meant to expand jurisdictions or provide
alternatives to available statutory remedies).
136. See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32–34 (2002); Pa. Bureau of
Corr., 474 U.S. at 41–43.
137. 556 U.S. 904 (2009).
138. Id. at 907.
139. Id. at 907–08.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 908.
142. See Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114, 136 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (Ryan, J.,
dissenting), aff’d, 556 U.S. 904 (2009).
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writing for the Court, held that the rule of Noyd v. Bond143 still
controlled: the military courts do have the power of extraordinary
relief under the All Writs Act.144 Furthermore, the Court held that
any determination of “finality” was immaterial, as it is in the very
nature of a coram nobis petition to reconsider what had been a final
judgment.145
B.

CAAF’s Dismissal of Private Gray’s Claim Is a Failure to
Exercise Proper Authority

Despite the Court’s clear statements that CAAF has jurisdiction
to issue extraordinary writs, CAAF nevertheless found that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear Private Gray’s petition.146 This finding was in error
for several reasons. First, CAAF relied on the finality of the judgment
under Article 76 of the UCMJ in determining that it could not
entertain a coram nobis petition,147 but this is a direct contradiction of
Justice Kennedy’s analysis from Denedo.148 In addition, CAAF stated
that coram nobis relief is entirely unavailable if other remedies
exist.149 This is based on dicta in Denedo commenting that coram
nobis relief is limited in such a way as to protect the finality of
judgments in most cases.150 But, tracing the origins of this statement
from United States v. Morgan,151 the Denedo Court read its own
precedent a little too broadly.152 The cited segment of Morgan does
indeed discuss the alternative remedy of habeas corpus.153 However,
Morgan did not find that access to habeas corpus is a limit on
extraordinary writs, but quite the opposite: the federal habeas statute

143. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695 n.7 (1969) (“[T]here can[not] be any doubt as to
the power of the Court of Military Appeals [under the All Writs Act] to issue an
emergency writ.”).
144. See Denedo, 556 U.S. at 911.
145. See id. at 915–16 (“Article 76 codifies the common-law rule that respects the
finality of judgments. Just as the rules of finality did not jurisdictionally bar the court in
Morgan from examining its earlier judgment, neither does the principle of finality bar the
[military court] from doing so here.” (citation omitted)).
146. See United States v. Gray, 77 M.J. 5, 6 (C.A.A.F. 2017).
147. Id.
148. Denedo, 556 U.S. at 915–16.
149. Gray, 77 M.J. at 6.
150. See Denedo, 556 U.S. at 911 (citing United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511
(1954)).
151. 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
152. See Denedo, 556 U.S. at 911 (citing Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511).
153. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 510–11.
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should not be read as a bar to other writs and remedies.154 Moreover,
CAAF seems to ignore the fact that Private Gray’s case is before
them in part because the federal courts have barred his habeas
petitions until such time as the military courts render a decision on
the issues raised by the coram nobis petition.155
It is admittedly likely that even if CAAF had granted review,
Private Gray’s petition would have failed on the merits. ACCA had
already reviewed the petition on the merits and denied all of his
claims.156 This is not the point, though. CAAF’s failure lies not so
much in miscarrying justice with respect to Ronald Gray but rather in
its refusal to fully exercise its power of review. The military courts
narrowed their own jurisdiction by standing so stubbornly on the
“finality” ordered by Article 76, refusing to exercise their authority to
review final decisions despite the Supreme Court’s recognition of
such power. Doing so weakens the legitimacy of military justice as an
independent judicial system because it treats the collateral review
power of the Article III courts as superior and preferable to the
military courts’ power to review their own judgments.157
It is also a disservice to Private Gray. Even though ACCA’s
denial of his claims portends denials by other reviewing courts, he at
least enjoyed a full consideration of his rights before it was
determined that none had been violated in this instance. He now sits
both unvindicated and unheard. This can only lead to one of two
judicial outcomes: either intervention from the Article III courts or
inaction from the whole of the judiciary. In either event, the military
courts are left worse off, either as “subservient . . . to their Article III
civilian counterparts”158 or as a place where soldiers only find that
proverbial “rough form of justice.”159 Neither outcome is a welcome
one.
CONCLUSION
This much is clear: the military courts have the power to review
petitions for extraordinary relief just like any other court created by

154. See id. at 511 (“Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to
impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral attack upon their convictions.” (quoting
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952))).
155. See Gray v. Belcher, No. 5:08-CV-03289-JTM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149574, at
*3 (D. Kan. Oct. 26, 2016).
156. See Gray v. United States, 76 M.J. 579, 594 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2017).
157. See Vladeck, supra note 114, at 204–05.
158. Id. at 200.
159. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 (1957).
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Congress. The exercise of this power is acutely important when life
and death are at stake, even if the end result is to deny such relief.
Even a denial of relief after a full and fair consideration better
respects the rights of defendants than simply refusing to consider the
claim. CAAF failed in this regard when it claimed a lack of
jurisdiction to grant Private Ronald Gray’s coram nobis petition.
The precise facts of Private Gray’s situation are relatively rare.
Only a few servicemen sit on death row, and few are likely to join
them. However, while Gray’s case is perhaps the most perplexing, it is
not the only example of military courts weakening their own
authority. The military courts have declined to use the All Writs
power to enforce certain First Amendment protections in the
Guantanamo military commissions and in the Chelsea Manning
case.160
The precedents of the Supreme Court make clear that CAAF
does possess such jurisdiction. CAAF’s failure to exercise its
authority either leaves Private Gray without a venue to be heard or
invites intrusion into the independence of the military courts. Without
that independence, the need for such courts is called into question.
This is a disservice to a system that has willingly adapted over time to
afford soldiers a substantial degree of due process. It also undermines
a system established to serve the cause of the “good order and
discipline [of] the armed forces,” which “thereby . . . strengthen[s] the
national security of the United States.”161 CAAF must, therefore, do
better for us all.
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